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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS' TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC, 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action, involving multiple claims and multiple 
parties, arises from a real estate contract and related docu-
ments covering the purchase and sale of approximately 20 
acres in Weber County, Utah. An action to rescind the con-
tract was commenced in the Weber County District Court. A 
number of the issues were resolved by summary judgment; 
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others were resolved following a jury trial. Following the 
trial, the appellant sellers appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to §78-2-2(3){i), Utah Code Annotated, which 
grants appellate jurisdiction in connection with judgments 
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original juris-
diction. Thereafter, the Utah Supreme Court poured-over the 
case to the Court of Appeals for disposition, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Respondent, Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. (ATGF), 
is involved in only part of the issues that are presented on 
appeal. The issues relating to ATGF were resolved by summary 
judgment. The issues on appeal relating to this respondent 
are as follows: 
1. Whether the appellants Combes, as sellers of the 
property, were named insureds under the subject policy of 
title insurance (the trial court having ruled on summary 
judgment that they were not). 
2. Whether the Combes, as sellers, had an action in 
tort against the buyers' title insurer because of the error 
or inaccurancy that appeared on the title insurance policy 
(the trial court having again ruled on summary judgment that 
they did not). 
3. Whether the error in the subject title insurance 
policy resulted in any damage to the appellants (an issue 
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members of his family were sellers and Casper J. Breuer and 
William M. Harrison were buyers (Froerer deposition 6). 
3. Froerer performed the legal work in connection with 
the real estate transaction which consisted of preparing ex-
change documents among members of the Combe familyf preparing 
drafts of documents, and preparing revisions of the proposed 
agreement. The legal work of Froerer culminated in a real 
estate contract between the sellers and buyers which was 
dated December 29, 1979 and signed by all of the parties 
(there were also some later amendments to the agreement that 
are not material). (Froerer deposition 6,7,35; deposition 
exhibits 19 thru 25). 
4. In connection with the legal services performed, 
Froerer always considered his client to be Steve Keil 
(Froerer deposition, 5,6,38,39,43). Combe wasn't ever sure 
who Froerer represented (Combe deposition 30). Froerer was 
paid out of the proceeds of the sale at the time of closing 
(Froerer deposition 8,35). 
5. After the sale had closed on December 29, 1979, 
Froerer agreed to provide title insurance on the transaction. 
No preliminary title report had ever been issued or relied 
upon prior to the closing of the sale. Froerer testified 
that no preliminary title report had ever been issued nor 
asked for (Froerer deposition 52). Combe likewise acknow-
ledged that no preliminary title report had been issued, and 
- 5 -
in fact didn't even know that Froerer was going to issue a 
policy until after the transaction was closed (Combe deposi-
tion 139) . 
6. Before issuing the policy of title insurance, 
Froerer had Bill Torvat conduct a title search of the county 
records. Bill Torvat was an employee of Froerer and was also 
a student at Weber State University. Mr. Torvat had been 
previously trained to do title searches and had done other 
searches in the past for Froerer. (Froerer deposition 
9,12,13,32). 
7. A policy of title insurance was eventually issued by 
Froerer on November, 14, 1980 (more than 10 months after the 
sale). The underwriter on the policy issued by Froerer was 
ATGF. The policy is attached hereto as Addendum I to this 
brief. 
8. The policy of title insurance did not make an excep-
tion for the acqueduct easement granted to the United States 
of America which is the subject of this lawsuit. No explana-
tion is given for not showing the easement as an exception, 
and it is assumed that Torvat erred in simply missing the 
easement at the time of his title search. 
9. At some later date, the acqueduct easement was dis-
covered by the buyers Breuer and Harrison, and an action was 
commenced by them to rescind the real estate contract (plain-
tiffs' complaint; R-l). 
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10. Buyers were successful in their action for rescis-
sion, the Court having found as a matter of law on summary 
judgment that the acqueduct easement was a substantial encum-
brance upon the fee title; that the sellers could not perform 
their contract of delivering an unencumbered title to the 
buyers; and buyers were not required to accept the defective 
title. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Summary 
Judgment herein; R-509,521). 
11. In this action, sellers Keith P. Combe and Evelyn 
Combe have filed cross claims against Froerer and ATGF. In 
their First Cause of Action they seek damages against Froerer 
based upon his negligence for breach of duty as an attorney; 
and in their Second Cause of Action they seek damages against 
both Froerer and ATGF based upon the issuance of the policy 
of title insurance. (Combe1s Amended Cross-Claim against 
Froerer and ATGF; R-563). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ATGF's argument on appeal may be summarized as follows: 
1. Combes have never plead that they are insureds under 
the ATGF policy of title insurance. 
2. Combes have not plead any action in tort against 
ATGF. 
3. Combes are not named insureds under the ATGF title 
insurance policy and have no contractual rights thereunder. 
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4. The better reasoned cases reject the imposition of 
tort or abstracter's liability upon a title insurer. 
5. Even those jurisdictions recognizing tort liability 
require justifiable reliance upon a preliminary title report, 
a fact that does not exist in the instant case. 
6. And in any event, Combes have suffered no damage. 
They didn't have an unencumbered title to start with; they 
still have the very same property that they have always had; 
and they are not entitled to a windfall because of a title 
examiner's mistake. 
7. The remaining unresolved issues between the respon-
dents were properly bifurcated from the trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT COMBES (THE SELLERS) ARE NOT INSURED 
UNDER THE POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE AND 
HAVE NO RIGHTS THEREUNDER 
At no point in this action have the appellant Combes 
ever plead that they are insureds under the subject policy of 
title insurance. To the contrary, their amended cross-claim 
(R-569) simply alleges at paragraph 20 that ATGF issued a 
policy of title insurance to (the buyers) Casper J. Breuer 
and William M. Harrison. They now claim that the title 
insurance policy is ambiguous and that a factual issue exists 
as to whether they are insureds. Yet no amendment to their 
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pleadings has ever been made, nor has such amendment even 
been sought. In the absence of such an amendment, the claim 
by appellants is pure and simply outside the scope of the 
existing pleadings.5 
In any event, the policy of title insurance is clear as 
to who is insured. Schedule A of the policy lists the "Name 
of Insured" as "the Equitable Estate created by a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract dated January 15, 1980,^ executed by 
Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe, his wife, and First Security 
Bank, N.A., Ogden, Utah, trustee, as seller, and Casper J. 
Breuer and William M. Harrison, as buyer (see Addendem I) w. 
There can be no reasonable misunderstanding as to what is the 
"Equitable Estate". It is a basic and well understood prin-
ciple of real estate law that a contract for the sale of land 
operates as an equitable conversion wherein the buyer's 
interest becomes realty and the seller's interest becomes 
personalty; under this fundamental concept, the interest of 
b
 This point was argued by ATGF at the time of the summary 
judgment. It was claimed that prejudice would result if an 
amendment were allowed at such a late date (R-814). The 
point was also of concern to the trial judge who noted in his 
memorandum ruling that it was difficult to tell from the 
pleadings just what the claim against ATGF was (R-879); 
nevertheless, he went ahead and ruled against the Combes on 
the merits. 
6 The date of the contract as shown in the title insurance 
policy is inaccurate. It was assumed for purposes of the 
motion for summary judgment that the policy was intended to 
insure the real estate contract of December 29, 1979. 
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the buyers becomes known as the "Equitable Estate" which is 
an unambiguous term.7 Casper J. Breuer and William M. 
Harrison were the owners and the only owners of the "Equita-
ble Estate" and were thus clearly the named insureds under 
the title insurance policy. 
The real estate contract by its terms further requires 
the sellers to furnish a policy of title insurance at their 
expense to the buyers. Froerer was asked to provide title 
insurance to the buyers, not the sellers. It would go far 
beyond the bounds of reasonableness to now torture the 
unambiguous language of the policy into something that was 
not required by the contract, nor requested by the parties. 
The title insurance policy is described throughout as an 
"owners" policy. When a contract is executed "the purchaser 
acquires the equitable interest in the property at the 
moment the contract is created and is thereafter treated as 
the owner of the land".8 The owners were Casper J. Breuer 
and William M. Harrison. The sellers held bare legal title 
for security purposes only. No party has ever claimed, nor 
were premuiums ever paid, for the issuance of a lenders 
policy of title insurance. 
The court can further take judicial notice of the fact 
' See 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, §317, et seq.; 
Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987). 
8
 Lach v. Deseret Bank, supra 
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that customary real estate practices generally require a 
seller to provide title insurance to a buyer. It would be an 
extremely unusual situation for a seller to be purchasing 
insurance for himself in a real estate transaction and there 
is nothing within the facts of the instant case to even 
suggest any such intent. The Combes did not claim by affida-
vit or otherwise that they expected to be insuredf or even 
thought that they were insured. Their sole allegation (in 
the pleadings) is that ATGF issued a policy of title insur-
ance to the buyers (R-569). 
The trial court was correct in holding that Breuer and 
Harrison were the insureds under the title insurance policy. 
Any other holding would have been blatant error. 
POINT II 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE CANNOT JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF 
ABSTRACTERS TORT LIABILITY 
Once againf it is important to point out that the sole 
claim by Combes against ATGF is set forth in the Second Cause 
of Action of their Amended Cross-Claim (R563). This claim 
(which is so vague that it probably doesn't even state a 
claim) seems to sound more in contract than in tort.9 
There is no claim of negligence; no claim of proximate cause; 
9 Combes First Cause of Action is clearly in tort, but is 
asserted only against Froerrer, not ATGF (R-563). The Second 
Cause of Action is asserted against both Froerer and ATGF and 
appears to be in contract. 
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and no claim of duty. The only thing that is claimed is that 
Froerer conducted a title search and based thereon ATGF 
issued a policy of title insurance. Such pleadings should 
simply not be allowed to permit the Combes to proceed on 
contract, tort, negligent misrepresentation, or any other 
theory they might happen to think of between the date of the 
pleading and the time the appeal is concluded.^ 
However, even if the pleadings were proper, there are 
substantial reasons why Combe's action against ATGF must 
fail. 
It is true that there is a split of authority on the 
question of whether a title insurer can be held liable in 
tort for negligently misstating the state of title in a pre-
liminary title report. The better reasoned cases hold that 
the mere issuing of preliminary title reports does not impose 
tort liability upon a title insurance company. See for exam-
ple Anderson v. Title Insurance Company, 655 P.2d 82 (Idaho 
1982) where the Idaho court discusses at length the existing 
case law and concludes that there can be no separate tort 
liability against a title insurer, and that any liability 
1U
 Appellants also at page 36 of their brief made the 
sweeping statement that any liability of Froerer is imputed 
to ATGF as a matter of law. This is not so. ATGF is a title 
insurance underwriter and stands behind the policy issued by 
Froerer. Froerer, however, was not an employee of ATGF but 
was acting as an independent lawyer. ATGF is not responsible 
for Froerer's legal malpractice, if any, committed in connec-
tion with his law practice. 
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must rest upon the title insurance contract. The court 
stated: 
HWe decline to hold that the title insurance company 
was impliedly acting as an abstracter and we refuse to 
impose the liabilities of an abstracter upon a title 
insurance company merely because it issued a preliminary 
title report". 
See also Horn v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 557 
P.2d 206 (N.M. 1976) holding that a title insurer has no duty 
to search records and performs searches only for its own pro-
tection and benefit; Klickman v. Title Guaranty Company of 
Lewis County, 716 P.2d 810 (Wash. 1986). 
To allow tort claims against the title insurer is to 
make a mockery of the very concept of title insurance. What 
purpose, for example, would a title underwriter have in 
setting policy limits or otherwise restricting its liability 
if the policy itself becomes meaningless and liability can be 
unrestrictedly imposed? Title insurance by its very nature 
is a contractual animal, and the rights thereunder are 
defined and established by the contract itself. In Diversi-
fied Mortgage Investors v. U.S. Life Insurance Company, 544 
F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1976), it was stated as follows: 
"A title insurance policy is a contract between the 
insurer and insured, and the rights of the parties are 
as provided for therein...The parties having agreed 
upon their own terms and conditions, "the courts can-
not change them and must not permit them to be vio-
lated or disregarded". 
See also Anderson v. Title Insurance Company, supra; Behen v. 
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Transamerica Title Insurance Company, 531 P.2d 641 (Colo. 
1974) . 
In accordance with the above, the title policy in the 
instant case at paragraph 12 of the policy Conditions and 
Stipulations provides as follows: 
"This instrument, together with all endorsements and 
other instruments if any attached hereto by the Com-
pany, is the entire policy and contract between 
the insured and the Company. 
Any claim of loss or damage whether or not based on 
negligence, and which arises out of the status of 
the title to the estate or interest covered hereby 
or any action asserting such claim, shall be re-
stricted to the provisions and conditions and 
stipulations of this policy." 
Thus it appears that the policy of title insurance unam-
biguously restricts any further coverage or liability beyond 
the four corners of the policy. 
In Transamerica Title Insurance Company v. Johnson, 693 
P.2d 697 (Wash. 1985), the Washington Supreme Court has held 
as follows: 
"No action could be founded upon the breach of a duty 
owed only to some person other than the plaintiff. 
He must bring himself within the scope of a definite 
legal obligation, so that it might be regarded as 
personal to him. "Negligence in the air, so to speak, 
will not do". 
In Transamerica, the plaintiff title insurance company issued 
title insurance policies for three parcels of real estate 
which failed to except from coverage a sewer assessment lien 
on each parcel. The title insurance policy, as is typical, 
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was purchased by the seller of the property for the benefit 
of the purchaser who was the insured under the policy. 
Pursuant to its policy, the title insurance company paid the 
sewer assessments and sought subrogation against the vendor 
of the property. The vendor opposed the subrogation claim 
contending that "the title insurer owes the duty of search 
and disclosure to the seller". 693 P.2d at 699. In analyz-
ing the vendor's claim that it was owed a duty by the title 
insurance company, even though the vendor was not a named 
insured under the title insurance policy, the Washington 
court noted that: "The defendant seeks to impose liability 
upon the title insurance company which is beyond that con-
tained in the policy itself. The defendant is not an insured 
under that policy and is not provided coverage therein. It, 
therefore, does not seek to impose liability based on a 
theory of contractual liability." 693 P.2d at 699. In 
reviewing similar cases, the Washington court concluded that 
no court had allowed one other than an insured under a title 
policy to claim any rights under that policy or to impose a 
duty on the title insurer absent some justifiable act of 
reliance by that third party, and the Court affirmed the 
summary denial of the seller's claims against the title in-
surer. 693 P.2d 701-02. 
Even if the court rejects the better reasoned cases as 
cited above and adopts the view that a title insurer becomes 
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an abstracter when it issues preliminary title reports upon 
which third parties rely, Combe's action against ATGF still 
must fail as a matter of law because in the instant case no 
preliminary title report was in fact ever issued. There is 
not a single authority in Combes' brief that supports their 
position. Indeed, the very authorities cited by Combes 
support the position of ATGF. 
In Moore v. Title Insurance of Minnesota, 714 P.2d 1303 
(Ariz. 1986), the court recognized the distinction between 
issuing a preliminary title report and issuing a policy of 
title insurance. Where a preliminary title report was given 
to an escrow company with a list of requirements, and then 
acted upon by the escrow officer, liability could be imposed. 
The court in its holding relied upon §552(1) of the Restate-
ment of Torts 2d which imposes liability upon business pro-
fessionals who negligently give false information upon which 
other parties in the transaction justifiably and reasonably 
rely. 
In Jarchow v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 48 Cal. 
App. 3d 917 (Cal. App. 1975), the court stated as follows: 
"When a title insurer presents a buyer with both a 
preliminary title report and a policy of title 
insurance, two distinct responsibilities are assumed. 
In rendering the first service, the insurer serves as 
an abstracter of title—and must list all matters of 
public record regarding the subject property in the 
preliminary report". 
See also White v. Western Title Insurance Co., 710 P.2d 309 
(Cal. 1985) where the identical language is used. Everything 
in Jarchow, White and Moore presupposes the reliance upon the 
preliminary title report. 
In Heyd v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, 354 N.W.2d 
154 (Neb. 1984), the court uses very similar language to 
Jarchow; 
"A title insurance company which renders a title report 
and also issues a policy of title insurance assumes two 
distinct duties. In rendering the title report, the 
company serves as an abstracter of title and must list 
all matters of public record adversely affecting title 
to the real estate which is the subject of the title 
report." 
Again, any imposition of liability must flow from the re-
liance upon the preliminary title report. 
In Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92 (Cal. App. 
1974), the court states as follows: 
A purchaser of lienor relying on a report of a title 
company that negligently fails to report a recorded 
defect affecting title or lien can recover all damages 
proximately caused by the abstracter's negligence. On 
the other hand, where he did not rely on the title 
company report, damages cannot be recovered even though 
the report was negligently prepared" 
To the same effect is Malinak v. Safeco Title Insurance 
Company of Idaho, 661 P.2d 12 (Montana 1983); Transamerica 
Title Insurance Company v. Ramsey, 507 P.2d 492 (Ala. 1973); 
Chun v. Park, 462 P.2d 905 (Hawaii 1970) all holding that 
under some circumstances abstracter liability can be imposed 
where there is a reliance upon a title commitment. The 
instant case is far stronger than any of these cases. Here, 
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not only is there a total absence of reliance, but an absence 
of a preliminary title report at all, which in all of Combes1 
authorities is the thing that was claimed to have been relied 
upon. 
The cases of Williams v. Polgar, 215 N.W.2d 149 (Mich. 
1974); First American Title Insurance Company, Inc. v. First 
Title Service Company of the Florida Keys, Inc., 456 So.2d 
467 (Fla. 1984); and Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & 
Guarantee Co., 195 So. 195 (Fla. 1940) aren't title insurance 
cases at all, but relate only to abstracts of title. These 
cases arenft in point. Sickler even goes so far as to hold 
that there can never be any liability against an abstracter 
in tort, and that any action must be based upon breach of 
contract. The Utah case of Christensen v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983) is a negligent mis-
representation case which requires the element of reliance.H 
There is no authority whatsoever in Combes' brief 
holding, or even suggesting, that a title insurer can be 
liable for abstracter's tort liability in the absence of a 
preliminary title report upon which someone relied to their 
detriment. 
The Real Estate Contract between the Combes and Breuer 
11
 Negligent misrepresentation is another claim that has 
never been plead against ATGF. 
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and Harrison was entered into on December 29, 1979. The 
Combes' obligation to pass title free of easements and 
encumbrances was fixed at that time. The ATGF title policy 
was issued nearly a year later, in November 1980. The Combes 
were not insured under the policy. There is nothing in the 
policy that would extend coverage to them. They never relied 
upon any preliminary title report or title commitment (as 
none ever existed). And they have no contractual or tort 
standing in which to raise any claims against the insurer. 
POINT III 
COMBES ACTION AGAINST ATGF MUST FAIL BECAUSE 
THEY HAVE SUFFERED NO DAMAGE 
Paragraph 3 of the Exclusions from Coverage provides 
that defects and encumbrances "resulting in no loss or damage 
to the insured claimant" are excluded from coverage under the 
policy. This obviously would be so as a matter of law even 
in the absence of a specific exclusion clause. It is the 
position of ATGF that Combes have suffered no legal damage, 
and that their claim must fail even if they were to be suc-
cessful in somehow pursuading the court that they are insured 
under the policy.^ 
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a 
right of rescission and an action for restitution as an 
1 2
 If the trial court is affirmed under Points I and II, 
the issues under Point III become moot. 
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alternative to an action for damages where there has been 
material breach of contract. Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 
591 P.2d 449 (Utah 1979). The buyers in the instant case 
have elected to rescind the contract, and the court has 
granted its judgment of rescission. By very definition, 
the concept of rescinding a contract requires that the part 
wishing to rescind must place the opposite part/ in status 
quo.13 Thus, the Combes are entitled to have restored to 
them everything they had before they entered into the con-
tract with the buyers. The parties will be put back in the 
same position. 
Combes may be disappointed that they didn't own what 
they represented they owned (or even what they may have 
thought they owned). But there is certainly no legal princ 
pie that entitles them to a huge windfall because of a mis-
take made by a title examiner upon which they never relied. 
Such a result would be unconscionable. Had the mistake not 
occurred, and a title insurance policy been issued disclosi 
the acqueduct easement, the sale would have still been res-
cinded. Combes have what they have always had. They didn1 
lose anything by reason of the title examiner's mistake. 
They simply never had the unencumbered title to start with. 
A leading case which ATGF deems to be closely in point 
13
 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, §511. 
- 20 -
is Lawyers Title Insurance Corp, v. Research Loan and In-
vestment Corporation 361 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1966). There 
the title company had neglected to include within the excep-
tions on Schedule C of the policy some five documents of 
record which constituted encumbrances against the property 
and in which the insured had been required to pay $20,701.66 
to clear. The property had been transferred under a deed by 
which the grantees accepted the property subject to mort-
gages, but the grantees did not know about the five existing 
mortgages missed by the title company. In reversing the 
trial court, the 8th Circuit held as follows: 
"If Research had applied for title insurance prior to 
closing the deal we would have an entirely different 
situation. In that event, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that Research was relying on the title insurer 
to advise it of the true state of the record title and 
intended to assume, in the context of the policy condi-
tion, only those obligations which the title search 
revealed. However, in this case the application for 
title insurance was made after the deal had been closed 
and there is no evidence showing that Research was rely-
ing on the title insurer to advise it of encumbrances. 
The only possible conclusion is that the "assumed or 
agreed to" condition applies to the four Berg deeds of 
trust since Research did assume by deed all existing 
obligations, did not rely on the title insurer to advise 
it of encumbrances, and did have reason to believe the 
prior owners had placed such encumbrances on the 
property". 
The case at bar is far stronger than Lawyers Title Insurance 
Corp., as here we have an uninsured seller rather than the 
insured buyer seeking compensation for his own failure of 
title. 
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Another significant case is Rudolph v. Title and Trust 
Company of Florida, 402 So.2d 1975 (Fla. 1981). There the 
insureds, condominium owners, purchased leasehold interests 
and the title company through inadvertence issued policies 
insuring the titles in fee simple. A class action suit was 
filed for breach of the title policies which insured fee 
simple interests. The court, although commenting that the 
title company should have been aware from the public records 
that leaseholds and not fee simple interests were obtained by 
the purchasers, nevertheless held that the claimants were not 
induced to purchase their properties by the title insurance 
they later obtained and further held that the title company 
was entitled to a directed verdict. 
The insurance contract and the authorities generally 
support the proposition that there can be no claim without 
damage. The mistake in the title insurance policy was not a 
cause of any damage to defendants Combe. The Combes have 
lost nothing that they ever owned. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY BIFURCATED THE 
CLAIMS BETWEEN RESPONDENTS 
Rule 42(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as 
follows: 
The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, 
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third party claim, 
or of any separate issue or any number of claims, 
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cross-claims, counterclaims, third party claims, 
or issues". 
Pursuant to the above Rule, the court bifurcated the 
claims and cross-claims between the respondents and ordered 
separate trials. These claims involved the claim of buyers 
Breuer-Harrison against their title insurer ATGF, as well as 
the claims of ATGF against Froerer. ATGF claimed that if any 
liability is imposed against it because of the defective 
title insurance policy, that it in turn can pass the liabil-
ity to Froerer because of his negligent title search (R-897). 
These claims were bifurcated for the following reasons: 
1. All of the respondents requested the bifurcation. 
2. None of the respondents were seeking a jury trial in 
connection with the issues between themselves. Only Combes 
sought a jury trial in connection with the remaining issue 
between buyers and sellers. 
3. In the eyes of the respondents (even though they are 
adverse parties between themselves), it is only the Combes, 
at least up to this point, who take unreasonable and out-
rageous positions. All respondents have represented to the 
court that they believe the issues between themselves can be 
amicably settled once the issues with the Combes have been 
resolved. 
4. All respondents argued to the trial court that it 
makes no sense to force parties to litigate claims who don't 
want to litigate. The policy of the court is and should be 
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to promote rather than to discourage settlement. 
5. Combes have no interest or standing with respect to 
any of the issues between respondents. 
Appellants can hardly argue prejudice simply because 
they are prevented from injecting insurance into the case; 
prevented from confusing the jury; or prevented from getting 
off onto side issues. 
Bifurcation and/or severance of claims is clearly a 
matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and, absence an abuse of discretion, will not be dis-
turbed on appeal. King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988); 
Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981). 
In this case, there were compelling reasons to grant 
separate trials. In light of these reasons, it would probab-
ly have been an abuse of discretion to deny the bifurcation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments and authorities as outlined in 
this brief, Respondent ATGF respectfully urges that the sum-
mary judgment granted by the trial court in its favor against 
appellants Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
By 
David E. West 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent ATGF 
- 24 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the S day of June, 1989, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. were served 
upon the following: 
John P. Ashton 
Erik Strindberg 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants Combes 
Jack L. Schoenhals 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Attorney for Respondents 
Breuer and Harrison 
Theodore E. Kannell 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Attorney for Respondent 
Robert Froerer 
- 25 -
ADDENDUM I 
A A A A"A 
• • * • • • • • • * * f * * * . * * * » * . « * - * _ . - . 
A*:A*A :A::A:*A,:A::A:;A*;n:'A:*A:!A::A:*A:;A::A 
* * ' * % * * 4 * * w • i ' : * * ; « * t * *i •;.•;. 
o r 
z 
C 
> 
z o w 
o 
H Z 
A"A"A*A "A-'A'A'A"^'^ A"A"A*'A"A" A"A A' / r A" A*: ; 
* J & ^ A * A * A * ^ J & A U & & U & A v A ^ A v < & AvAC AC. '-•>.'. 
*=>X 
£>X 
£>!x 
_ w 
O 5 
9 i 
n ! 
W 
C/3 
* 
o 
c 
• S 
* 2. 
=- 2 
HI o* 
s » 
H 
w 
o 
I? 
Z 
o 
.v.v.v. .V. V 
. • W W 
.V..V. .V..V..V..V. V..V,.V 
.*>:x 
&>X 
b>X 
f^x 
£>-: 
£>x 
£>x 
: - w w > v w w i f t v w w w w w w w w w w w w w ^ ^ 
..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V..V.. V .V.V. . - : 
k ^ . « ^ - % # . » r r » ^ . * j » ? % * . * ^ 2 r»»*?««4 • / ; % « 9 i f S / 3 i / * w 3 * ' w » * - » r - f c ^ S * « * * % s3»**»<»$» r J%-*2% * ? » # ^ % * ? % * 3 % -
E X H I B I T - J i l l 
C O V E R A G E S A V E AS A L J A U» .>*L .n
 0 , w ^ . 
\ A A r. A A A A /i A 
• ^ •.>-• >•' «c . - ~ -s V> : 
A #i* A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A <i A A .* A A A ,» 
TITLE GUARANTY FUND, INC. 
TW U » T I ' i 
Deavcr, Coiorvito 
Issued By, 
Robert E. F r o e r e r 
(Members Name) 
536 24th S t r e e t , S u i t e 2B 
(Address) 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE 
OWNERS 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE. THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE 
B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, Attorneys' Title 
Guaranty Fund. Inc.. a Colorado Corporation, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy 
shown in Schedule A. against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule 
A. and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, 
sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Trtle to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land; 
4. Unmarketability of such title. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Company has caused this Policy to be signed and sealed, to be valid when 
Schedule A is countersigned by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, alt in accordance with its 
By-Laws. 
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Fletchet Thomas. Secretary 
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TITLE GUARANTY FUND. INC. 
COVERAGE SAME AS A L T A OWNER S POLICY FORM 8 1970 AMENDED 10-1 7-70 
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy 
1. Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances) 
restricting or regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of the land, or regulating thecharacter. 
dimensions or location of any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in 
ownership or a reduction in the dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation of any such law. 
ordinance or governmental regulation 
2. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police power unless notice of the exercise of such rights ap-
pears in the public records at Date of Policy 
3 Delects hens encumbrances adverse claims or other matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by 
the insured claimant, (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the in-
sured claimant either at Date of Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by 
this policy and not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured 
claimant became an insured hereunder, (c) resulting m no loss or damage to the insured claimant, (d) attaching 
or created subsequent to Date of Policy, or (e) resultmq \n loss or damage which would not have been sustained 
if the insured claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured by this policy. 
CONDIT IONS AND STIPULATIONS 
^•RnitJon of T t r m i 
The fot'Owmg terms **nen used m tfvs policy mean 
a) " injured me insured named m Schedule A and subject to any ngnt$ or 
enses i r ? Company may na*e nad agamst tne named insured those who 
ceed to tne interest of sucn .^sured C> operation of lav* as distinguished from 
cnase including Out not lirr ted to heirs distributees devisees surnvors 
sonai representatives ne«t o' *»n or corporate or fiduciary successors 
b) ' insured d a i m a n i an insured cia«mmg toss o# damage nereunoe* 
c i "knowledge actual knowledge not constructive nn'owieoge or notice 
en may be imputed to *n insured by reason of any public records 
d) land the land described specifically or by reference m Scneduie A ana 
rovements a f fned thereto which by 'aw constitute real property provided 
*t*tr the term land does not mc'ude any property beyonc the imes of the 
i specifica'iy described or referred to m Schedule A nor any ngnt title 
rest estate or easement m abutting streets roads avenues aneys lanes ways 
• aten*ays but nothing n^ft^n sha» r-od«fyor limit thee* tent to which a right of 
ess to ano from the lane is insured t>y this policy 
e) mortgage mortgage deed of trust, trust deed or other security 
f) public records those records which by law impart constructive notice of 
ters relating to said lane 
Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance of Title 
The coverage of t r .s ooucy snaH cont.nue m force as of Date of Po'icv »n ta*or of* 
rMu*ta SO »ongas SuCh nsured reta-ns an estate Or interest in the 'ano or ho»OS 
noebtedncss secured Dy a purchase money mortgage given oy a purchaser 
n sucn insured or so long as such insured Shan na^e iiao«i«ty by reason of 
enants of warranty mact by Such insured m any transfer or conveyance Of 
n estate or interest provided however this poi«cy shall not continue m force in 
>» of any purchaser from such insured of either said estate or interest or the 
roteoness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured 
defense and Prosecution of Actions — Notice of Claim to be Given by an 
nsured Claimant 
l l T r i f Company at its Own cost and without unduede<ay S*al» provide for the 
»<"»se o' an insured m a« litigation consisting of actions or proceedings 
\me*ced »ga«nst such insured to the e*tent that Such litigation is founded 
n an alleged defect lien encumorance or other matter insured against by this 
cy 
(bl The insured shall notify the Company promptly m writing (i) m case an\ 
• c n o n or proceed ' - is begun as set forth m (a) above (••! m case knowledge snai 
come to *n msu ' f ereunoe* of any claim of title or interest wt»»ch n adverse tc 
m e tit«e to tne est* nr interest as insured and which might cause loss or damage 
for which the Cor" -ny may be liable by virtue Of this policy If Such prompt not»c* 
shau not be g ive ' *o m e Company then as to such insured ail iiaf>i»ty o' tn« 
Company snau c«-a^e and terminate m regard to the matter or matters tor »nicr 
Sucn prompt n c c e «s reduced provided nowe»er that t a ^ r e to notify sha*i«nrvr 
case prejudice tne rights of any such insu»eo under tn>s policy unless tn* 
Company snau be prejudiced tiy such failure and then oniy to the e»tem of swer 
prejudice 
(c) The Company shau havt the right at its own cost to institute ano wimo*/ 
undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any other act wtucn »n its 
opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish me title to me estate or «niie*est 
as insured and me Company may tane any appropriate action under the te*ms of 
this policy whether or not it shall be liable thereunder and shall not thereby 
concede liability or waive any provision of this policy 
(dl Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or interposed a 
defense as reouired or permitted by me provisions of this poi*cy me Company 
may pursue »ny such litigation to Imai determination by a court of competent 
jurisdiction and etpressiy reserves me right in its SOMP discretion, to apP*ai from 
any adverse judgment or order 
fe) in ait cases where this policy permits or reduces m e Company to prosecute 
Or provide for the defense of any action or proceeding the insured hereunder shall 
secure to me Company the right to so prosecute or provide defense m such *ct»on 
or proceeding anc at* appeals therein ano permit the Company to use at its 
option me name of such insured for such purpose Whenever requested by the 
Company such insured shall give the Company an reasonable a»o m any sucn 
action or proceeding »n effecting settlement securing ev»oence obtaining 
witnesses or prosecuting or defending such action or proceeding and the 
Company shall reimpurse such insured for any e ipense so incurred 
4. Notice of Lost—Limitat ion of Action 
In addition to me notices reouired under paragraph 3 (bl of these Conditions 
and Stipulations a statement m writing of any toss or damage for wfven A t% 
Claimed me Company <s hab'e under this policy snau be furnished to meCompany 
within 90 days after such loss or damage shall havt t>e*n determined and nought 
of action shau accrue to an insured claimant until 30 days after such statement 
than nave t>ten furnished Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage 
than terminate any liability of the Company under this po'<Cy as to fucn loss or 
damage 
Continued on cover sheet 
ATTORNEYS' I H L C ^u /nv~* ,*« . . . , 
Covci^* S*nv . A I T A Q+r+r-t Pol.ey. form B 1970 A. Jed 10-17-70 
AMOUNT POLICY OF HTU INSURANCE DATE Of rOUCY 
SCHEDULE A 
t 410 ,880 .00 NAME OF INSURED November 14 , 1980 
The Equitable Estate created by a Uniform Real Estate Cbntract g : 2 4 
Jated January 9, 1980, executed by KEITH P. CCMBE, and EVELYN C0MBEr 
l i s w i f e , and FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A., Ogden, Utah, Trustee , as o'clock—h M. 
feller, and CASPER J . BREUER and WILLIAM M. HARRISCN, a s Buyer, 
Premium $ 126?-50 
I. The estate or interest in the land described herein and which is covered by this policy is: 
An interest pursuant to that certain Uaiform Real Estate Cbntract dated January 9, 1980, 
yy and between KEITH P. OGMBE and EVELYN, his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., Trustee, 
J. The estate or interest rcfrrrcd to herein is at Date of Policy vested in:/ as Seller, and CASPER J. BREUER 
Parcels #1 thru #4: Keith P. Combe and Evelyn Combe j and WTTJ.TAM M. HARRISON, as 
Parcel #5: First Security Bank N.A., Trustee, and Keith P. Combe and Evelyn. | Buyer 
The land referred to in this Policy is situate in the County n f UKHTTR • 
State of Utah, and is described as follows: 
(SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE A) 
xjnters.j^ed: jfcfcert £ . Froerer 
Ogden, Vfeber Cbunty, Utah Issued Jti 
p*icr o N 9 1 4 5 0 9 
THIS rOUCY VALID ONLY IF SCHEDULE B IS ATTACHED 
ATTORNEVS' TITLE GUARANTY rUND, INC 
ill A 0~~** * r » , , «* 
»,m t 1»70 A~~K*»d W \7 70 SC11LDLLE B 
Tiu poluy docs not insure JCJinst low by rcivon of the following 
in AM (Ow*,ri» 51: 
ART ONE. This part of Schedule B refers to millcn uhich, if any such exist, may affect the title to said land, but which 
re nut shoun in this pohcy: 
. Taus or assessments which arc not sho*n as existing liens by the records of any faxing agency or by the public rec-
ords. *nd casements, liens or encumbrances v.hich arc not shown by the public records. 
. Right* or cfa;rib of persons in possession of said lam! uhich arc no: shoun by the public records. 
. Any facts, rights, interest, or claims which arc not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained by an 
inspection of \aid Jjnd. or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof, or by a correct survey. 
. M nine cta.ns. rc.scnations in patents, water rights, claims or title to water. 
Proceedings for municipal impro\cmcnt. which, at the date hereof, arc shown by the official records of any such citv, 
but have not required in the imposition of a hen u,vm. or establishment of an easement over, or adjudication of the 
rifai lo a public use of said land or any part thereof. 
\RT TWO This part of Schedule B shows liens. cncumb;anccs. Jcfccts and oihcr matters affecting the title to said fond 
to which saiu title is subject: 
axes for year 1980 are a lien, not yet due. I£x I.D. numbers: #1, 07-086-0033; 
2, 07-086-0039; #3, 07-086-0040; #4, 07-086-0034; #5, 07-086-0016, 
roperty is subject to easements to the ^ fountain States Telephone and Telegraph Ccnpany 
s described by document recorded in Book 1267, page 281 in the records of Weber County. 
roperty is within the boundaries of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, and the 
oitah Highlands Sewer Inprovernent District, and is subject to any and all assessments 
evied by said districts. 
nrecorded Real Estate Contract dated January 9, 1980, by and between KEITH P. COMBE 
id EVELYN COMBE, his wife, and FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., Trustee, as Seller, and 
^SPER J. BREUER, and WILLIAM M. HARRISCN, as Buyer. 
ie Ccnpany shall assume no liability under this policy to the extent that loss or 
amage arises frcm failure to record the instrument or instruments necessary to 
/idence the estate or interest covered by this policy. 
Lght of Trustee or Receiver in the even of bankruptcy, receivership or insolvency 
? the Seller to repudiate the Contract. 
lis policy does not insure or guarantee performance by the Seller, his heirs, 
xxessors and assigns, under the Terms of the Contract. 
:operty taxes for 1978 and 1979 are a lien on Parcel #1 and Parcel #4. Amount due 
1 Parcel #1: $581.30 for 1978, $552.59 for 1979. Amount due on Parcel #4: $581.30 
>78 and $552.59 for 1979. 
ntcrsigned: Robert E. Froerer 
AtttftOfuc* Officer m A*cat 
POLICY SERIAL NO. O- 14509 
Tbc f>pcd strut number above MUST b< OK u w 
SCHEDULE A 
PARCEL 1 : 
bcgTnnTng a t the S o u t h w e s t corner of the Nor thwes t Q u a r t e r 
of the Northwest Q u a r t e r o f S e c t i o n 2 3 , Township 5 N o r t h , Range 
1 West, S a l t Lake M e r i d i a n , U .S . Survey; and r u n n i n g t h e n c e 
East 2J8 f e e t , t h e n c e North 900 f e e t , more or l e s s , t o t h e c c n t c 
of Combe Road, t h e n c e N o r t h w e s t e r l y a l o n g s a i d c e n t e r l i n e t o a 
po in t North of b e g i n n i n g , thence South 930 f e e t , more o r l e s s , 
to the p l a c e o f b e g i n n i n g . C o n t a i n i n g 5 a c r e s , more or l e s s . 
PARCEL 2 : 
beg inning a t a p o i n t 763 f e e t East, o f the S o u t h w e s t c o r n e r o f 
the Northwest Q u a r t e r o f the Northwest Quarter of S e c t i o n 2 3 , 
Township 5 N o r t h , Range 1 West, S a l t Lake M e r i d i a n , U.S. S u r v e y 
Running t h e n c e E a s t 1 7 4 . 3 6 f e e t ; t h e n c e North 625 f e e t , more 
or l e s s , t o t h e c e n t e r l i n e of Combe Road; t h e n c e N o r t h w e s t e r l y 
along s a i d c e n t e r l i n e t o a p o i n t North o f b e g i n n i n g ; t h e n c e 
South 750 f e e t , more o r less, t o the p o i n t o f b e g i n n i n g . 
Conta in ing 2 . 7 5 a c r e s . 
PARCEL 3 : 
Beginning at a p o i n t 9 3 7 . 3 6 
of the Northwes t Q u a r t e r o f 
2 3 , Township 5 N o r t h , Range 
f e e t East o f the S o u t h w e s t c o r n e r 
the Northwes t Q u a r t e r o f S e c t i o n 
1 West , S a l t Lake M e r i d i a n , U . S . 
Survey; running t h e n c e E a s t 6 0 . 7 3 f e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h e a s t e r l y 
to a p o i n t on the c e n t e r o f Combe Road, s a i d p o i n t b e i n g E a s t 
197 .88 f e e t ^nd Nor th O # 0 4 , 3 0 - West 5 7 1 . 0 2 f e e t t o t h e c e n t e r -
l i n e of Combe Road and N o r t h w e s t e r l y a l o n g s a i d c e n t e r l i n e 
15 f e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h w e s t e r l y a l o n g c e n t e r l i n e o f s a i d r o a d t o 
i a p o i n t North o f b e g i n n i n g ; t h e n c e South 625 f e e t t o t h e p l a c e 
I of b e g i n n i n g . 
PARCEL 4: 
Beginning at a point 238 feet East of the Southwest corner 
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 
23, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
U.S. Survey; and running thence East 250 feet, thence North 
835 feet, more or less, to the center of Combe Road, thence 
Northwesterly along said centerline to a point North of 
beginning; thence South 900 feet, more or less, to the place 
of beginning. Containing 5 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5: 
I beginning 438 feet East of the Southwest corner of the 
[• Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, 
.'Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
j.^ nd running thence East 275 feet, thence North 750 feet, 
j more or less, to the center of the County Road, thence North-
, westerly along the center of said County Road to a point 
Ncrth 835 feet, more or less, from the point of beginning, 
rthence South 835 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning 
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CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS—CONTINUED 
ons to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
Company sha.'i have We option to pay or otherwise settle for or in the name 
su'ed cia*mant any claim insured agamst or to terminate all liability and 
ons of me Company hereunde' by paying or tendering payment of the 
o f *nsurance unoer tn<s poncy togemer with any costs attorneys teesand 
•S incurred up to tne time Of SuCn payment or tender of payment, by the 
cia>mant arte au ihor i /ed by the Company / 
mlnation and Payment of Loss 
laD'iity of the Company under this policy shall in no case eaceed the (east 
e actual toss of the insured claimant or 
e amount of insurance stated m Schedule A 
Company will pay inadd«t»ontoany loss insured against by this policy alt 
posed upon an insured m litigation earned on by tne Company for such 
ano an costs attorneys fees ano expenses m litigation earned on by such 
•nth the written authorisation of the Company 
n r.abwify nas oee« definitely f««ed m accordance with the conditions of 
:y the toss or oamage shati De payaoie withm 30 days thereafter 
tlon of Liability 
"• * - * i i " i f o' o^manta»r>ar •-unae'tnispo»»cv ia i if the Company atte* 
ce«veo not»ce of an ai*eg*d detect i»en or encumbrance insured agamst 
r by litigation or Otnerwise removes SuCh defect l ienor encumbrance 
s^es m e t.:ir> as """Su'ed wimm a »easona&'e time arte* receipt o» J u C 
» in the e*ent ot litigation until mere has been a final determination by a 
ompetent jur.sdict.on and disposition of an appeals therefrom adverse 
»e as msurec as provided *n paragraph 3 hereof or (c) for liability 
y assumed by an insured m settling any claim or suit without pr»or written 
if the Company 
Ion of Liability 
ments unbe* mis policy eacepf payments made for costs attorneys 
rjipenses shall reduce me amount of the insurance pro tanto No 
ran be made without producing this policy tor endorsement of such 
mess tne policy be lost or destroyed *n which case proof of such loss or 
i sha»i be furnished to the satisfaction of the Company 
f Noncumulaflve 
>'ess*y understood that the amount of insurance unOer this PO*«cy shall 
3 Dy an* amount me Company may pty under §ny policy insuring e*1he* 
D*ge shown or referred to m ScneOu* B hereof wh«cn rs a l e n on the 
"»'e'est covered by this policy or (b) a mortgage hereafter executed by 
wh.cn is a charge or lien on the estate o» interest described or referred 
3uie A ano me amount so paid shall be deemed a payment vnoei trws 
p Company shall have the option to apply to the payment of any such 
any amount that otnerwise wou*d be payable hereunder to the **%»fG 
>e estate o* interest covered by this po*<y ana the amount %opa*c s * e * 
be deemed a payment under thrs policy to said insured owner 
if me rano described m Schedule A consists of two or more parcels wh»ch ate 
not used as a single site and a toss is established affecting one or more of saiC 
parcels but not an the loss shad be computed and settled on a pro rata basis as •* 
the amount of insurance unoer tms po»cv was divided pro rata as to tne *a<ue 
on Date of P o k v of each separate parcel to tne wno»e eaciusive of any im-
provements maoe subsequent to Date of Policy unless a i^ow.ty or value nas 
otherwise been agreed uoon as to each such parcel by the Company and the 
insured i t the time of the issuance of this pofcey and shown by an eapress 
statement herein or by an endorsement attached nereto 
1 1 . Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement 
Whenever me Company snati na*e settled a cia»m under this policy • « right of 
subrogation shall vest m the Company unaffected by anY act of the msured 
Claimant The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled to an rights and 
remedies which such insured cia»mant would neve had agamst any person or 
propeny in respect to Such claim had this po'iCy not been issued and if requested 
by the Company such insured claimant shall transfer to the Company ail rights 
and remedies agamst any person or property necessary m order to perfect sucn 
right of subrogation ano snail permit me tompany to use the name of such 
insured claimant »n »ny transaction or litigation involving such rights or remedies 
If the payment does not co»er the loss of such insured claimant, me Company 
than be subrogated to sucn rights and remedies in the proportion which sa.d 
payment bears to me amount of said loss If loss should result f rom any act of sucn 
insured claimant such act shaft not vo«d this policy, but the Company m mat 
event shall be teowted to pay only that pan of any losses insured agamst 
he*eunae* which sha'i eaceed me amount, if any. lost to the Company by reason of 
the impairment of the rrght of subrogation 
12. Uabltlty Limited to this Policy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instruments if any 
• f l acked hereto by the Company is the entire pot*cy and contract between the 
insured and the Company 
Any cia«m of loss or damage whether or not based on negligence and wfwch 
•r ises out of the status of the title to the estate or interest covered hereby or any 
action asserting such claim shaM be restricted to the provisions and conditions 
and stipulations of this policy 
No amendment of or endorsement to this pof»cy can be made eacept by 
writing endorsed nereon or attached hereto signed by either m e President a V*ce 
President m e Secretary ano Assistant Secretary, or validating off*cer or 
au thon /ed signatory of the Company 
13. Notice*. Where Sen* 
AM notices revvec' to be given the Company end any statement «n writing 
feqwec to be fwrnisned the Company shaft be addressed so * * Home O f i < e 
